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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we build up a model to show the existence of essentiallinks between 
labor contracts (owner-worker) and financial contracts (entrepreneur-financial in-
stitution). These two contracts interact with each other, and this affects their 
length. The optimal length will depend on several environmental features. In 
particular we consider uncertainty, the type of project, workers' skills, investment 
specificity and the type of financial institution that provides the funds. 
'Iraditionally, the economist at the time of analyzing the optimal length of 
labor contracts have focused on the existing trade-off between the commitment 
value of the long-term contracts and the fiexibility of the short-term ones, Gray 
(1978), Dye (1985), Danzinger (1988), Anderson (1991). Thus, when 
the degree of uncertainty in creases (for a given discount factor), the owner signs 
short-Iength contracts, in order to have enough flexibility to better match future 
situations. The cost he has to bear doing that, is a lower effort level implemented 
by workers. They have no security to be employed in the future and therefore 
they act in a short-sighted way. 
On the other side, the analysis regarding the financial contracts Williamson 
(1988), Von Thadden (1994), shows that the credit structure is the result 
of two effects: A disciplinary effect of short-term credits (due to the fact that 
these contracts allow not to supply the required new funds in the future periods if 
several short-term conditions are not met); and a commitment effect that provides 
the firm with the possibility to undertake long-term actions and achieve higher 
expected returns. 
Vlhat is new in our work is to consider, in an integrated manner, the optimal 
length of both contracts (labor-financial). Under our point of view, this is the 
"natural" way to reflect the vision of a firm as a nexus of contracts, using ter-
minology introduced by Jensen & Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart 
(1986). This approach facilitates a better relationship between the length of ex-
ternal firm's contracts (type of project) and the length of the internal contracts 
(type of labor-financial contract). 
3 
4 LT-ST Labor and Debt Financia] Contracts 
Furthermore, this treatment allows us to rationalize several stylized facts con-
cerning the interaction between labor and financial contracts. In particular ,we 
provide an explanation of the linkage between the short-term project's financing 
and the highly flexible labor markets that characterize the Anglo-Saxon mar-
kets. The complementary approach, observed in Japan and Germany, provides 
our second stylized fact: the financial and labor contracts are long-term, and the 
projects undertaken by firms are more of long-term type. Finally, a third stylized 
fact shows the type of financing observed in each paradigm: market financing in 
the first case and bank financing in the second. 
Certainly there are sorne historie al reasons behind the aboye correlations. The 
Glass-Steagal Act (1933) in US and the Bank Charter act (1844) in the UI< have 
kept banks smaller in size than their corresponding counterparts in Germany and 
Japan. Allen, F. & Gale, D. (1995) measure the size ofthe extended banking 
system in Germany, through the total balance sheet as a percentage of GDP, and 
found it is more than double of the American figure. BerglOf, E. (1994), em-
phasizes that the non-existence of the aboye restrictions in Germany and Japan 
has affected not only banks' size but also firm's ownership to be less dispersed 
compared to US-UI<. In the former countries, we find a situation where a small 
number of big banks have a large shares in the main enterprises. This fact has lead 
to a lower turnover in firm's ownership and also in financial-firm's relationships. 
Furthermore, with these longer relationships, firms have been able to develop 
long-term projects, and linked with these projects, to define longer relationships 
with their employees. 
In contrast, firm's ownership in the US is much dispersed among households, 
Prowse, S. (1990) reports that the percentage of outstanding corporate equity 
in households' hands is three times higher in the US than in J apan. This com-
position, as Porter, M. (1992) shows, favors the percentage of stocks held for 
long-term considerations be almost double in Germany than in the USo Conse-
quent with this reality, American firms' managers are more willing to invest in 
short-term projects and to define a shorter labor relationships as Jacobs, M. T. 
(1991) points out. 
To explain the aboye economic facts, we propose a dynamic model with two 
sequential bargaining stages: (lender-entrepreneur and entrepreneur-worker). 
The outcome of the first bargaining is a financial contract that can be short-term 
(=ST) or of long-term (= LT). This specific choice will be the result of balanc-
ing the disciplinary effect of the ST contracts and the commitment effect of the 
LT contracts which leads to an increase in the entrepreneur's bargaining power 
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respect workers. This trade-off will induce, through the labor negotiation, the 
workers' incentives and at a last stage the expected project's returns. The second 
bargaining defines the labor contracts, and can also be of short-term type (=ST) 
and long-term one (_LT). The number of workers hired in each contract, depends 
on the bargaining power allocation, that is a consequence of the first negotiation 
process. 
We show that the financial structure conditions labor contracting through the 
distribution of bargaining power between the negotiating parts. The labor re-
lations which are the output of this process will condition project's return, and 
backwardly the initial credit structure. In this way we obtain the double financial-
labor interaction. 
There are a few other papers that deal with sorne aspects of labor and financial 
interaction in contracts definition. For instance, Farmer, R. (1988) presents a 
model in which money and bonds are both held as a result of legal restrictions 
on the banking system lThis fact raises the cost of credit which ultimately causes 
finns to write labor contracts in which layoffs occur more frequently (ST contracts 
in our terminology). This dynamics points in the same direction as ours, that is, 
to link financial constraints in the British case to ST labor contracts. 
Three types of results we find. Firstly, a direct linkage between the length 
of financial contracts and the length of labor contracts. Secondly, a positive 
correlation between the contract's temporallength and the projects' one, that can 
also be long-term ( LT) or short-term ((-ST)). Finally, we show that contracts' 
length in bank-financed firms is higher than in market-financed firms. AH these 
results are in consistency with the stylized facts previously commented that defines 
the US-UK and German-Japanese paradigms. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the model. 
In Section 3 we characterize the Nash equilibrium and carry out a comparative 
static analysis. The comparison of the obtained results and the features of the 
US-UK and the German-Japanese paradigms is made in Section 4, where it is also 
proposed sorne empirical observation to test our model . 
The paper finishes with sorne concluding remarks in section 5. 
1 The Bank of England, differently to the Bundesbank or the Japanese Central Bank, under 
the Bank Charter Act (1844) is tightly eonstrained to provide short-term liquidity needs. We 
have shown reeently an expression of this poliey in the Barings Bank eollapse. 
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2. THE MODEL 
2.1. Description of the Model 
Let us consider separately the characteristics of the different components that 
define our two-period model: 
Projects 
We can characterize each project by three elements. The output a worker can 
generate in period 1 (Xl) and period 2 (X2 ), being Xl ~ X 2 • The liquidation 
value, L, at the end of the first periodo And thirdly, the first-period and the 
second-period probability of success, that is, PI = ep and P2 = e (O ~ e, P ~ 1)' 
where we assume that P and e are exogenously given and of public knowledge. 
Parameter e represents the quality of the project, and p is linked to an environ-
mental "noise" that hinders the action of the manager-entrepreneur to develop 
the project. Furthermore, we require ep to be bigger than ~ 2. In case of failure, 
the project generates no returns. If it has been successful in period i, generates 
an output Qi (see the firm characterization). 
Vve distinguish between LT and ST projects. There are two differences among 
them. Firstly, the L value is higher for the ST projects. Secondly, ST-project xf 
(Xf) is higher (lower) than LT-project Xf (Xf). 
Workers 
'Ve will use risk neutral workers. They will be hired using LT contracts (two-
period contracts)::l or ST contracts (one-period contract). By convention, n L is the 
number of workers contracted for both periods (denoted as LT workers); and nr is 
the number of workers hired just for period i (i = 1,2) (denoted as ST workers). 
The workers have to implement a verifiable normative effort,l/, (jornada laboral) 
in each period contracted. They also can implement a voluntary effort ( e) in 
the first period, to acquire some expertise, and become more productive in the 
second periodo This effort is assumed to be observable, but it is not verifiable 4, 
2 That is, in each period the probability of success is higher than the probability of failure. 
This is in connection with Proposition 2, as a necessary condition for firms to hire workers 
through long-term contracts. 
;3 \Vhenever the project is not liquidated after the first period, this workers will still be 
employed in the second periodo 
4 To consider this effort e (training effort) a private action, we want to assign a conunitl11ent 
weight to this action. \Vhen workers decide to implel11ent this effort e to becol11e more efficients 
in the next period, they are signaling an engagel11ent with the firm's future. 
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leading to a moral hazard problem, as e cannot be contracted ex-ante. The reward 
for this effort is given in the second period, once the higher workers' productivity 
generates an increase in the second-period per worker output. Finally, workers' 
effort cost function is given by c = C + ~ Ae2 [j 
Lender 
We assume risk neutrality in the agents that provide funds to the firmo We 
distinguish between two types of lending, through a bank (bank financing) and 
through the market (market financing). In the former situation, the firm demands 
funds to a particular bank which extracts all the expected funds the project can 
generate. The opposite is true in the latter framework. The firm offers par-
ticipation in the project financing to the best bid. Therefore, in this case, the 
entrepreneur can retains all the rents the project can generate. 
There is also another difference between these two complementary financial frame-
works. \Ve assume that a bank has a superior commitment than "the market" in 
the management of the firmo \Ve can argue in terms of historical relationships, 
or the possibility the bank can coordinate more efficiently the actions to take in 
extreme situations (like financial distress). Consistently with this, if the lender 
decides to refinance an initially unsuccessful project, the firm will be allowed to 
retain a higher share of second-period funds under a bank financing scheme than 
under a market financing one. Noting as F this share G, then, bank's F, FE, is 
higher than market's F, FAJ. 
Finally, the lender has the possibility to liquidate (not refinance) an unsuccessful 
project. In this case it receives a L amount. 
The Financial Contracts 
It is a vector {h, h, R 1 , R 2 , <1>, F} defined in the first period; where 11 ,12 are 
the firm's investments requirements in periods 1 and 2 to develop the project 7. 
\Ve note with R1 , R2 the returns the lender fixes for its credit of 11 in the first 
period and 12 in the second periodo These quantities are determined balancing the 
~ This can be seen as a local approximation to a more general cost function that satisfies: 
oC O 02C O Te> 'oe2 > 
G 'Ve have argued that this F is an expression of the commitment of the lender towards the 
firmo It \\'ould be wrong to consider this parameter a measure of the entrepreneur's bargaining 
power, because a high F could be related with high values of R¡ and R2, leading at the end to 
lo\\' entrepreneurs profits. In fact, we have assumed a null (absolute) entrepreneur's bargaining 
power under a bank-financing (market-financing) scheme. 
7 This amount is linked to some factors such as the project's quality e , the labor costs, and 
other development costs. 
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power between the lender and the entrepreneur. Dnder a bank-financing scheme, 
a zero-entrepreneur-profit conditions works. By contrast, the lender of a market-
financed firm, fixes Rl and R2 through a zero-lender-profit condition. 
We focus on ST redeployable debt contracts. Therefore, whenever the entrepre-
neur pays Rl to the lender at the end of the first period, he wins the right to 
receive the new funds lz, otherwise the lender would receive a high punishment. 
On the other hand, in the case of a project failure, firm' s control rights are 
transferred to the lender. In that situation, it will decide with a probability <I> to 
renegotiate or not the contracto If not, a liquidation is triggered and it receives 
an L amount. If so, the project will be refinanced with an I2 amount. The "cost" 
for the entrepreneur, besides the initial R2 payment, is the lost of a share 1 - F 
of the second-period profits, that goes directly to the lender. 
The probability <I> of a contract renegotiation can be determined ex-ante, because 
we deal with a symmetric information game, without informational acquisition 
along the time. Therefore, the ex-ante probability coincides with the ex-post 
probability. Obviously as <I> tends to one, these redeployable ST contracts, be-
come simply LT contracto In this sense, we denote as 1 + <I>, the "length" 01 the 
financial contracto 
The Labor Contract 
It is a vector {w, A, T} also defined ex-ante. Parameter w is the fix part of 
the workers wage. This amount rewards the normative effort 1/ , to assure the 
workers participation constraint, and is paid every periodo There is also a vari-
able component in the workers wage ti. This is paid in the second period to the 
workers that have increase their productivity through the implementation of the 
ah'eady mentioned effort e in the first periodo Specifically, this output-related 
component of workers wage is given by Aw6Q2' where 6Q2 is the increase in the 
verifiable second-period per-worker productivity generated by these more produc-
tive workers, (see the firm characterization). As only the LT workers Therefore 
in the second period, as only the LT workers receive a wage of w(l + A6Q2)' 
Finally T is the length of the contract through which the workers are hired. 
T = 1 (2) represents a ST (LT) contracto 
li This variable component in workers' wages results to be particularly important in coun-
tries such as Japan where the long-term schemes in the labor relationships are more common. 
Kanemoto, Y. et alt (1992) reports that the average workers' payments in a non-fue basis is 
up to 40% of the total wage. 
) 
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We assume a risk neutral entrepreneur-manager, (there is no separation be-
tween control rights and ownership rights). The firm has limited liability with 
regards to the financial claims. Regarding to the workers claims, the firm burdens 
an unlimited liability concerning the fue part of the workers wage, w. Furthermore, 
we assume that the LT workers have the legal right to receive w in the second 
period even if the project is liquidated. We can consider that to obtain a legal 
permission to develop a project, the entrepreneur has to assure the reservation 
utility of the workers, w. Therefore, at the beginning of period one, the firm to 
fulfill its labor liabilities has to place in a public fund !J an amount w(2nL + nf). 
In this expression, there are two factors: w2nL to face the payment of the first-
period and the second-period LT normative efforts. wnr to reward first-period 
ST normative efforts. With these assumptions, we want to emphasize the cost to 
contract 2-period (LT) workers. As the firm has initially no internal funds, this 
labor costs are paid directly from the Il amount lent by the financial institution 
in the initial periodo Similarly, in the second period, an amount wn~ is paid in 
advance to the ST workers hired. 
The firm is a monopoly in project's output market. This is to avoid strategic 
considerations in the contract length analysis. SpecificalIy, the demand side is 
modeled by a linear function of the type Pi = ai - bQi . With regard to the supply 
side, the production is given in each period by Ql = (1 + El)(nL + nf.)X1 and 
Q2 = (1 + (2)[n~ + nL (l + re)]X2 where Xi is the per-worker period-i output that 
results from the workers' normative effort 1/. The r parameter is exogenous, and 
defines the infiuence of the workers' voluntary effort e in the second-period out-
puto We are going to use this r as a measure of the project's quality. High-quality 
projects require some specific workers' training to be completed. To distinguish 
the real output from the verifiable output, we introduce in period i, the stochastic 
variable Ei. The existence of this variable is essential, otherwise the reward for the 
voluntaryeffort e, would be WA.6.Q'2 = WA.6.Q2 = wA()re , therefore, dependent 
on e. This fact would have dropped the moral hazard problem. This E variable 
is assumed to be white noise, and can be linked to factors like manager's actions 
to hide conveniently the real increase in productivity, or simply environmental 
uncertainty. 
From the previous hypothesis we can distinguish between two different frameworks 
to be studied separately: Al LT Projects' framework BI ST Projects' framework 
9 In Spain the name is FOGASA. 
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2.2. Timing of the game 
¡st period period 
) ( 
1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ 
1/ The entrepreneur initially has a project (LT or ST) and bargains with a 
financial institution (a bank or the market) to seek for funds 10. 
2/ After signing the financial contract, the entrepreneur hires a number nL 
of LT workers and nr of ST workers. 
3/ Workers implement their efforts (normative 1/ and voluntary e). 
4/ First-period results are made. If successful, there is a payment Rl to the 
lender who provides new funds. If not successful, the lender decides to 
renegotiate or liquidate the contract with a probability <P. 
5/ If the contract is renegotiated, new funds are provided. 
6/ The entrepreneur has the choice of whether hire ST workers or noto 
7/ \Vorkers implement second-period effort, which is only the normative 1/ 11. 
8/ Second-period payments are made. 
2.3. Dynamics of the Game 
The driving force in our model comes from the fact that hiring LT workers gen-
erates two opposite effects. Firstly, there is an increase in the productivity of the 
firm in the second periodo Secondly, there is also a raise in firm's fixed labor 'costs. 
It is more costly to hire one two-period (LT) worker than to hire two one-period 
(ST) workers. This is so, due to the stated legal requirement to pay second-period 
reservation wage w to the LT workers, even, if the project is liquidated. There-
fore, the marginal fix cost to hire one LT worker is w(l - Pe), where Pe is the 
project continuation probability. 
As the loan becomes of LT type (<p high, and Pe high) , the first effect rises, as 
LT workers are more willing to implement higher voluntary efforts e. On the 
other hand, the second effect diminishes because of the lower marginal saving to 
contract ST workers, that is, w(l - Pe) diminishes. Both effects go in the same 
direction to link LT financial contracting, with LT labor contracting. 
10 In arder to first consider the financial arrangell1ent, we are assull1ing that the firll1s have 
more financial constraints than labor ones. This is for example the case when we deal with 
low-quality projects. 
11 In LT worker's case, due to the training effort e , this 11 is ll1uch more productive. 
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3. SOLVING THE MODEL 
3.1. LT PROJECTS 
3.1.1/ Second-Period Analysis 
In order to compute the perfect Nash equilibrium in this symmetric informa-
tion model, we have to use the Kuhn algorithm and solve the game backwards. 
The first step, would be to determine the number of sr workers the entrepre-
neur will hire in the second period (n~). The second step will be to discover if 
the lender will decide, ex-post, whether to continue the project or not after the 
first-period results. 
Second-Period sr Workers 
The entrepreneur has to solve the maximization problem 12: 
The FOC leads to the following result: 
8 8S Ufn = o =:::} n~ = 111 ax{ N2 - n L (l + re), O} (1) n 2 ~ 
U1I'tIl 1\1* - a-W2 
n· 2 = 2bX2(l+CT~) 
\\lhere E2 are the expectations at the beginning of the second period, 0"; is the 
shock variance and iih O~2 is the second-period per-worker relative wage with 
regard to output. 
Ifwe check the expression (1), it can be a comer solution (ifnL or w are high). 
To avoid this situation, we consider an upper bound to r and W2 14. 
12 This is considering a discount factor equals to one. 
13 'Ve account in first-period profits the cosy of the fix part of LT workers wage, w. This 
ex-ante accounting is a consequence of the legal requirement to pay LT workers their reservation 
wage w in both periods, even if the project is liquidated. 
14 'Vithout loss of generality, if we consider that in the LT project, xf = xi' == X and in 
the ST project xf > X and xf < X, then, the '1' upper bound value to assure El {ng} > O 
for both type of projects is given by '1'2 S; r == 2A(1-pl ; where we have used expressions (2) 
IipXp,,(a-w¡ ) 
alld (5) and that Xl to be high enough to fulfill új¡ == Iip~l < ~ . This last assumption is to 
make certain that r is also valid for the ST projects. 
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It is straightforward to show that increases in second-period per-worker produc-
tion (= X 2 ) produce two different effects in nf Firstly, there is a decreasein 
the relative wage 'úh that leads to an increase in the number of labor contracts 
because it is cheaper to hire workers. The second effect, which is linked to the 
increase in the per-worker production, leads the firm to demand a lower number 
of workers. In this trade-off, the first effect is bigger (lower) than the second one 
if relative wages are high (low) enough 15. 
With regard to the influence of the environmental uncertainty in the labor con-
tracts, we can show that increases in a;, generates two effects: The first one 
(substitution effect) leads to a lower nL and therefore to an increase in n~ lü. The 
second one (absolute effect) motivates an overall decrease in aH labor contracts. 
If first-period labor contracts are basically sr, then, the second effect will offset 
the first. This logic is reversed when first-period contracts are basically LT. 
FoHowing the timing of the game, we have to analyze the lender problem with 
regard to his decision of whether to continue the project or not . 
Lender Decision Over Project Continuation 
\Ve deal with sr redeployable debt financial contracts. Therefore, first-period 
results will determine two different situations: 
- If the project has been successful in the first period, then, the entrepreneur 
pays R1 to the lender, and he wins the right to obtain a refinancing. The en-
trepreneur is interested to continue the project, because he has limited liability 
concerning the financial claims. As we have assumed that the lender would receive 
a high punishment not providing the new funds, the refinancing is assured. 
- If there is no first-period returns, there is a control rights transference to 
the lender. In that situation, the liquidation is not immediately triggered, and 
a renegotiation starts with a probability <D'. The out come of this process is a 
refinancing. The cost for the entrepreneur, besides the payment of R2 , is that he 
has to give up a share 1 - F of second-period profits. 
To make consistent <D' with the ex-ante probability to refinance a failed project, 
<D, the financial contract conditions settled by the lender have to make it ex-post 
indifferent wether to continue the project or noto That is, L = (1- F)E2 {Ufn }+ 
15 Specifically, when úh < ~ (which is assurned in the last footnote as W2 < W1 < ~), 
then, increases in second-period per-worker output X2 leads to a decrease in the number of 
second-period labor contracts. The opposite is true when W2 > ~ 
16 ST contracts in this uncertain frarnework are more attractive for the entrepreneur than LT 
ones, d~e to their higher flexibility. 
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()R2 - /2 17. Consequently, the lender will randomize his decision. In equilibrium, 
to adequate his decision with the ex-ante expectations made by all the agents- in 
this symmetric information game, it will choose <1>' = <1>. 
3.1.2/ First-Period Analysis 
In the first period all agents make decisions: 
aJ LT workers decide their voluntary effort which generates the second-period 
increases in productivity. 
bJ Using workers' policy, the entrepreneur will decide ex-ante the conditions that 
will characterize the labor contractS and the number of LT and ST workers that 
he is going to contract in the first periodo 
cJ In the first stage, the lender will characterize the financial contracto 
Workers Effort in the First Period 
The problem to be solved by the LT worker in this first period is the following: 
Vlhere Pe - ()p + (1 - ()p)<D 
The FOC leads to: 
18 
The previous express ion tells us that workers' effort in creases with <D. As 
project continuation probability increases, LT workers implement higher efforts 
since they think that they are more likely to be rewarded accordingly in the second 
periodo This is the commitment effect of LT financial contracts. 
Making use of this fact, and expression (1) of second-period ST workers; it is 
17 If this relationship would have been satisfied with inequality, that is, BR2 - 12 + (1 -
F)E2 {ufn} ~ L, then ip' = ~, and the financial contract had been apure ST contract or apure 
LT contracto 
l~ \Vhere the continuation probability, Pe, is composed of two terms. The first-period proba-
bility of success Bp, and the ex-ante probability of continuing an unsuccessful project (1- Bp)iJ>. 
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straightforward to obtain a negative correlation between ST workers and the <I> 
parameter. This is stated in the following lernrna: 
LEMMA 1 
Jf there is an increase in project continuation probability (credit is more of LT 
type) , then, there is an increase in the proportion of LT workers in the second 
period (= 82). Analytically : 
1 ~~ > °1 (3) 
Proof: 
DirectIy by the reduction of n~ with <I>, and the fact, proved in Proposition 1, 
that n L is an increasing step function on <I>. 
First-Period Entrepreneur Problen1. 
The entrepreneur's decision set in the first period ( DEn), circumscribes to 
compute the LT workers (nL ), the first-period ST workers (nf) and the share of 
the second-period increases in the verifiable output that goes to the LT workers 
(A). In order to do so, we have to maximize the ex-ante entrepreneur utility 
(_ UEn). 
l\1aX{DEn} El {Í\Qd + JI - (2n L + nf)w - BpRl + p<I>Ufn (3) 
\Vhere P<I> Bp + (1 - Bp)<I>F 
The FOC is shown in the first point of the Appendix 19. The result for the 
share A is the following: 
Jl.. U En = O ==? I A 1 I (4) a>.. 1 - 28 
19 To solve the maximization procedure we have used the hypothesis made in footnote 15 to 
assure that Ednn > o. 
LT-ST Labor and Debt Financia,] Contracts 15 
Expression (4) shows us that a high-quality entrepreneur (O high) , tries to 
minimize the free-rider problem with regard to LT workers, reducing the shareof 
second-period rents that go to workers (low A). Reversing the aboye logic when O 
is low; then, A is high to give incentives to workers' effort. 
With regard to the entrepreneur's worker hiring policy: 
a UEn _ O L + S _ N* _ a - WI 
-¡¡:::s I - ===} n nI - I = bX ( 2) 
nI 2 Il+O"€ 
(5) 20 
With ~[1>] = PePq,r¡ - w(l - Pe) [r¡ - r:~2] (7) 
The polynomial express ion 6. [1>] represents the difference between the entre-
preneur's marginal utility to contract a LT worker and to contract a ST worker. 
Expression (7) shows that ~[1>] =1- O 21 for a given 1>. This fact shows us that in 
equilibrium all first-period workers are LT or ST 22 with the 1>-parameter defining 
the different cases according to the sign of ~ [1>]: 
When ~[1>] < O, we have a~L UEn < O, and the equilibrium situation is such 
that all first-period labor contracts are of ST type. As ~[1>] is increasing with 1>, 
only for low 1> values can this situation be possible. Note also that if r¡ is high 
enough (r¡ 2 r¡* - w(~;~n), then, ~[1> = O] > O and it will not be first-period ST 
labor contracting. This is reasonable, because r¡ is proportional to workers' quality 
(j) 23, to project's qua lit y (r), and to the wages that re\vard the non-voluntary 
effort (w), which are factors that give incentives to LT labor contracting (see 
Lemma 2). It is also interesting to emphasize that r¡* is independent of the type 
oflender, that is, for high r¡ values, both market-financed and bank-financed firms 
will only contract LT workers in the first periodo In Proposition 3, we are going 
to show that for low r¡ values, this symmetric outcome is broken, and there is a 
bias towards ST labor contracting by market-financed firms. 
20 W¡ = op"i<¡ is the period-one per-worker relative wage. 
21 Except for a set of values of zero dimensiono 
22 This is a consequence of the symmetric information problem we are dealing with, as well 
as the use of linear functions, which make this analysis a first-order one. 
23 As A increases, workers feel that it is more costly to implement the voluntary effort. In 
this sense :t is a measure of workers' quality. 
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If ~[<I>] > 0, expression (6) shows that {)~L UEn > 0, then, aH first-period labor 
contracts are LT (nL = N;) 24. It is concluded that as the financial structure is 
oí LT type, then, first-period labor contracts are also oí LT type. 
As a final comment, it is interesting to point out that the express ion ~[<I>], 
is composed oí two terms. The first (PeP<I>r¡) , which is positive and is weighted 
by the ex-ante probability to continue the project (Pe), accounts íor the benefits 
oí LT labor contracting. This first term is also composed oí two íactors that 
give incentives to contract on a long-term basis; that is, the ex-ante proportion oí 
second-period profits P<I> belonging to the entrepreneur, and the r¡-íactor, already 
mentioned, which is a mixture oí the structural parameters that are correlated 
with the benefits oí hiring LT workers. This positive term is the expression oí 
the initiaHy reíerred commitment effeci oí LT contracting. 
The second term ((1 - Pe)w), which is negative, and is weighted by the ex-ante 
probability to not continue the project, is the express ion oí the marginal cost to 
contract a LT worker in stead oí a ST one. This cost, comes írom the entrepre-
neur's legal responsibility to satisíy the payment W in the second period to aH LT 
workers, independently oí the project's interruption. Under this view, we obtain 
that this term shapes the rigidity effect oí LT contracting. 
From this trade-off we see that as <I> increases, the first (second) term becomes 
bigger (lower) as the project continuation probability, Pe, increases. Therefore the 
equilibrium in these circumstances is based on LT workers. 
If we represent the polynomial ~[<I>] = O we obtain: 
24 Note that this is the case when <l? ---+ 1 , then Pe = P<l> = 1 and this implies that the value 
.6.[<l? = 1] = 7J > O 
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From this figure, we can see that for <I> = <I>*, there is a balancing of the pre-
viously mentioned two effects. If the financial contract, which is defined through 
<I>, results to be lower than 1>*, then, all first-period workers are hired on a short-
term basis. On the other hand, if <I> is higher than the threshold value <1>*, then, 
the result is reversed and only LT labor contracts are signed. These results are 
outlined in the following proposition: 
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PROPOSITION 1 
To define the entrepreneur's worker hiring policy in the first period, we have 
to consider two scenarios 25: 
1/ Jf r¡ ~ r¡* = w ~~~~ then, the threshold <1>* that satisfies ~[<1>*] = O is equal 
to zem and consequently there are only LT labor contmcts in the first periodo 
2/ Jf r¡ ::; r¡* = w ~~~~ in this case <1>* will be interior to the interval (0,1). 
This fact leads to define two different scenarios: 
VVhen <1> < <1>*, the first-period contmcts are only of ST type, and the equilibrium 
of the game is: 
L O s N* n = nI = 1 n~ = N; (9) 
lFhen <1> > <1>* there is only LT laboT contmcting, and the equilibrium of the game 
is given by: 
TVe can assure, as a consequence of the above points, that the pmportion of 
LT workers in the first period increases when credits are more of LT nature (<1> 
high). This is put formally as follows: 
I ~~ > °1 (11) 
Proof 
By construction. 
Using the expression ~[<1>l we can make an easy comparative static analysis 
with the different structural parameters of the model. 
25 Assuming as a hypothesis the upper bound to 1'2 given in footnote 14 
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LEMMA2 
An entrepreneur in a bank-financed firm is more willing to contmct LT workers 
than an entrepreneur in a market-financed firmo 
On the other hand, the likelihood the entrepreneur to contmct LT workers 
is positively correlated with the r¡ pammeter, that is, with project' s quality (r), 
entrepreneur' s quality (()) and workers' quality (*). 
Proofs: 
For the first part of the Lemma, see Point 2 in the Appendix. For the second 
part, looking at (7), it is straightforward to compute the variations of .6. with 
regaTd to different parameters. As .6.[<1>] is a monotone increasing function in the 
interval [0,1], then, increases (decreases) in.6. lead to a lower (higher) <1>*. These 
movements, will determine a higher (lower) probability <D to be bigger than <D* 
which is the way to note that the LT (ST) contracts are more probable. 
The reason why an entrepreneur is more willing to hire LT workers in a bank-
financed firm than in a market-financed firm, lies on the higher commitment of 
the bank with regard to the market as a fund provider. This is shown in the 
outcome of the renegotiation process that might follow when the project becomes 
unsuccessful in the initial periodo In that situation, the firm can retain a higher 
share of second-period profits if the lender is a bank than if it is the market, that 
is, FE > FM . This is relevant because the positive effect to contract LT workers 
is only present in the second period, when they become more productive. As the 
entrepreneur of a bank-financed firm can enjoya higher share of this benefits, he 
is more willing to offer LT contracts to the workers 2ü. 
Lender Problem 
In this first period, the lender has to define ex-ante the variables {R 1 , R2 , <1>} 
of the financial contracto The problem to solve is different under a bank financing 
than under a market financing, therefore we spit the analysis accordingly. 
26 That is ~~ < 0, and other things equal, the LT labor contracting zone (<l> ~ <l>*) is 
widened under the high F scenario (bank financing). 
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Bank Financing 
Under this financial scheme, the maximization problem faced by the bankis: 
M aX{DFin} - JI + ep(R1 + eR2 - J 2) + (1 - ep)L (12) 
S.t. JI + 71"1 - epR1 + p4>E2{u:fn} = O (13) 
S.t. eR2 - J2 + (1 - F)E2{U:fn} = L (14) 
In this case the lender has all the bargaining power, therefore it will define a 
financial contract, maximizing his profit function, and extracting ex-ante all the 
entrepreneur's rents (eq. 13). We use equality (14) as a selection criterium among 
different possible financial contract that satisfy equation (13). The idea, which has 
been commented previously 27, is to focus on contracts that induce the lender to 
adequate the ex-post probability to renegotiate a failed project to the ex-ante one, 
<1>. This will only happen, when the lender of a failed project is ex-post indifferent 
whether to continue the project or noto This is precisely what states equation 
14. In equilibrium, the indifferent lender adequates his decision to renegotiate an 
unsuccessful project with the ex-ante expectations made by aH the agents in this 
sy11l11letric infor11lation ga11le. 
Let us now see, the lender proble11l under the alternative financing 11lechanis11l. 
1v[arket Financing 
We 11l0del this situation, considering that the entrepreneur offers to finance the 
project to the best bid. Therefore, the lender's objective will be to maximize the 
entrepreneur's profit function, subject to his own participation constraint (lender 
zero-profit condition). This is shown in the following expressions: 
Alax{DFin} JI + 71"1 - epR1 + p4>E2{Ufn} (12') 
S.t. - JI + ep(R1 + eR2 - J 2 ) + (1 - ep)L = O (13') 
S.t. (14) 
The important point is that the lender determines <I> maximizing the same formal 
function under both financing scenarios. That is: 
~M aX{4>} 71"1 + Pc7l"2 + (1 - Pc)L (15) 
\Vhere 71"1 and 71"2 are the operative profits in period one and two respectively. 
27 See footnote 17. 
) 
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In point 3 of the Appendix are make explicit their expressions: 
71"1 - (Op - ~)XIN{(a - iíh) and 71"2 = (O - !)X2N2'(a - W2) + 2Pcr¡N{ (15') 
Both problems are formally identical. The only distinction between them is the 
value of F (FB > FM ). Obviously the determination of R 1 and R 2 in each scenario, 
is made using different constraints. Therefore the values are different. 
LEMMA3 
Under both financing scenarios, the lender defines the length of the financial con-
tracts, 1 + ~, maximizing the same formal objective function 
Proof: 
See Point 3 of the Appendix. 
Making use of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can fully characterize the optimal 
length of the financial contracts defined by the financier. This is shown in the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2 
Lender's definition of the optimal financial contract's length (1 +~) zs gwen 
by the liquidation value L of the project: 
Jf L :::; LF , it is optimal to define a LT financial contracts, that is, ~f = 1 
lVhen LF < L :::; LF , the lender will define the mir!...imum possible credit's 
length to induce the entrepreneur to contract LT, that is, <I> = <I>* 
For LF < L , apure short-term financial contract, ~ = 0, is the optimum. 
Jn case of r¡ ::::: r¡*, we know from Proposition 1 that <I>* = O. The lender will 
only define exclusive LT credits or exclusive ST credits. Furthermore, the threshold 
value that differentiates both contract situations, results to coincide under both type 
of lenders, that is LF = LF L 
Proof: 
See Point 4 in the Appendix, where we compute the values of LF and LF 
for each financing scenario. 
'Ve have obtained a negative correlation between the liquidation value L and the 
length of the credit. The higher is L, the higher is the willingness of the lender to 
liquidate an unsuccessful project in period one, and obtain asure return L. Note 
that, if it provides new funds J2 , it risks to obtain nothing because the liquidation 
value in the second period is zero. 
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We now consider the infiuence of the lender's type in the credit 's length defi-
nition 1 + ~. We find two effects. Firstly, Lemma 2 links the commitment of the 
lender inside the firm (F), with the willingness of the entrepreneur to hire work-
ers through LT contracts. This fact shows that a rise in F generates a marginal 
benefit to increase the length of the credit. This is so because in that situation it 
is easier to induce the entrepreneur to hire LT workers which are valuable for the 
lender because they are more productive and generate more profits in the second 
periodo We call this positive effect labor incentive effect. Secondly, there is a neg-
ative effect linked to F. As F raises, whenever a failed project is renegotiated, the 
share of second period profits obtained by the lender (1 - F) is lower. This fact 
gives disincentive to refinance an unsuccessful project, (decrease <p). The lender 
will prefer to liquidate a first-period unsuccessful project, instead of risking new 
capital for a lower premium. \Ve call this second effect lender's premium effect. 
The labor incentive effect points in the direction of inducing a higher credit's 
length under a bank-financing scheme rather than under a market financing one. 
On the other hand, the lender's premium effect goes in the opposite direction to 
give incentives to reduce the financial contract's length in bank-financed firms. 
The result of this trade-off is stated in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3 
Credit 's length dependen ce on lender's type is given by the following facts: 
Jf L :S LB , under both financial alternatives there are exclusive LT credits, 
that is, ~ B = ~ M = 1. As a consequence the firm only offers LT contracts in the 
first period, independently of the lender considered. 
TVhen LB < L :S LM , the average credit's length is lower under the bank-
financing scheme. Specifically ~ B = <PB < ~ M = 1. Furthermore, the firm 's labor 
policy is based on exclusive LT hirings under both scenarios. 
For LM < L :S LB . the firm only obtains ST credits with a market financing, 
~ M = O , but the bank defines credits with a positive length, ~ B = <PB . Un-
der these conditions market-financed firms only offer ST contracts to first-period 
workers. By contrast, bank-financed firms hire only LT workers. 
For L > LB , both types of lenders provides financing only by means of ST 
credits. Consequently, in the first period the firm only hires ST workers. 
Considering a uniform distribution over project liquidation values L in an 
interval [O, LH ~ LB], the overalllength average of the credits defined under both 
financing alternatives is the same. By contrast, the overall length average of the 
labor contracts is higher under the bank-financing scheme. 
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Proof: 
See Point 5 in the Appendix. 
It is interesting to point out that although LM < LB ; for LF , the logic is reversed. 
In other words, a bank reduces the length of their credits for a lower liquidation 
values than the market. Moreover, the amount ofthe length reduction is stronger, 
that is from ~ = 1 to ~ = CPÉ < CPÁI' Therefore, for L < LM we can assure 
that the credit length is lower under bank financing than under market financing 
(~B::; ~M)' This result, for low-L, values shows the superiority ofthe previously 
stated lender's premium effcct with regard to the labor incentive effect. On the 
other hand, in the high-L zone, the length of the credit is superior under the 
bank-financing scheme. This is so, because a lower credit's length is required to 
incentive the entrepreneur to hire LT workers (cpÉ < CPÁI)' This effect, previously 
called labor incentive effect, results in being higher than the lender's premium 
effect for high liquidation values. By this, we can see a rise in credit's length 
under the bank-financing scenario. 
A graphical representation of optimal credit's length ~ versus liquidation value L 
I~ - - - - -~- , .~ 
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Although we cannot talk in absolute terms of a higher or lower length average 
in the credits defined by a bank or the market, we have proved in Point 5 that in a 
set of projects with enough diversity28 the overall credit length average coincides 
under both types of lenders. Credit's length differences in the low-L zone are 
exactly offset with the opposite differences in the high-L zone. Furthermore, 
Proposition 3 states, labor contract's length results in being higher under a bank 
funding scheme than under a market funding scheme. In this sense, we can talk of 
a higher length in the overall firm's contract structure under bank funding rather 
than under market funding. 
Analyzing the threshold liquidation values L F , we can make a comparative 
static study relating the length of the financial contract with different structural 
parameters. The results are stated in the following lemma: 
LEMMA4 
Financial contract's length is positively correlated with the r¡-parameter, that is, 
with project 's quality (r), entrepreneur 's quality (e) and workers' quality ( ~). 
In all cases, by Lemma 2, the higher is tILe credit's length, the higher is the labor 
contract 's length. 
Proof: 
See Point 6 in the Appendix, where the derivatives of the threshold liquidation 
value LF with regard to r¡ are computed. 
In this symmetric information game, the lender has the same information as the 
entrepreneur. Therefore both agents can coordinate their actions to obtain a 
higher profits 2!J. In this way, we can understand how the length of the labor 
contracts interact with the length of the financial contracts. Specifically, we have 
shown that an increase in the r¡-parameter leads to a lower <1>* in the labor contract 
definition, and therefore, to an extension of the <1>-region where LT labor contracts 
are defined. On the other hand, Lemma 4 shows that the lender also increases the 
credit's length, 1 + <i>. Therefore, both effects are reinforced among themselves in 
giving incentives to the LT contractual relationships. 
As a final note, we can say that a more (less) uncertain framework, modeled 
with a lower (higher) p 30, leads to a larger (lower) ST contract proportion. 
2i\ 'Ve have modeled this project's diversity with a uniform liquidation value distribution 
coveril1g a \Vide spectrum (a l1ulllower bound al1d a higher-than-LM upper boul1d). 
2!J It is in his interest to do so, because a share 1- F of the second-period returns are enjoyed 
by the lender \Vhen he renegotiates a failed project. 
30 A high "noise" in the environment leads to a lo\V p. See the project's characterization 
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3.2. ST PROJECT 
The way we have modeled the difference between the LT and ST projects, allows 
us to solve the ST project's problem in a symmetric way than the LT one, just 
considering a higher liquidation value L, and a lower (higher) second-period (first-
period) per-worker output X 1(X2 ) 31. Taking into account the former changes, 
we just have to modify the expressions in a convenient way. The results we get, 
compared with the LT results, will permit liS to analyze the impact ofthe project's 
type in the proposed equilibrium contracts. 
To begin with, we study the proportion of the first-period and the second-period 
LT workers' contract ( 81 and 82) ;12. 
Analysis of Second-Period and First-Period Labor Hirings 
As in the LT project's case, we have to dístinguísh two frameworks, dependíng 
if <1> is higher or lower than the threshold va1ue <1>*. This value does not change, 
when we consider ST projects, because the polynomial .6.[<1>] = O is invariable to 
S 33. In case of <1> < <1>* we obtain an exclusive first-period ST labor cOlitracting, 
and for <1> > <1>* , there is only LT labor contracting in the first periodo The 
difference is that Ni is lower and N; is higher in ST projects 34. Making use of 
this result we can state the following lemma: 
LEMMA 5 
In the ST project we obtain that in both periods the number oi ST workers is 
higher, and the proportion oi LT workers (8) is positively correlated with the 
financial contract's length, that is, Wt > O ªJi > O . 
The difference with the LT project is that the second derivative is lower than the 
equivalent in the previous project' s framework, that is :8 { ~} < O . 
31 In fact to simplify things, we can consider, as we did in footnote 14, that in the LT project 
Xl = X 2 = X, and in the ST project Xl > X and X 2 < X 
:J2 N.B. AH the economic magnitudes are indexed \Vith L(S) to account for project's type. 
:J:J \Ve make the convention to note by S the changes that differentiate both type of projects, 
that is, an increase in Xl, a decrease in X 2 and an increase in the liquidation value L. 
:J4 \Vhere \Ve have assumed as it is stated in footnote 15 that {W2, wI} ::; ~ , which makes N2 
decreasing in X 2 and Ni decreasing in Xl . See expressions (1) and (5) 
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Proof: 
See Point 7 in the Appendix, where we compute d:'d* < O and d;¿ > O 
To determine the optimal credit's length, <I>, chosen by the lender, we make use 
of Proposition 2 and the following two facts. Firstly, a ST project has a higher 
liquidation value than a LT one, and by this, the lender is more willing to define 
low credit's length. Secondly , the threshold value LF and LF are decreasing with 
S. With this two facts we can state the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4 
When the projects have high (low) second-period retums and low (high) first-
period, the financial institution is more willing to provide funds through LT (ST) 
credits, that is <I> L 2': <í> s. This fact leads, at a second stage, to induce the entre-
preneur to contract workers in a LT (ST) basis. 
Proof: 
See point 7 in the A ppendix. 
This is an intuitive result to link the temporal nature of the project with the 
temporal nature of the financial contracts and ultimately of the labor contracts. 
4. DISCUSSION AND EMPIRICAL TESTS 
If we keep in mind Propositions 3 and 4 we can provide a theoretical explanation 
of sorne stylized facts with economic interest. 
The first one refers to the correlation between labor and financial elements 
with the project's type that characterizes the US-UK and German-Japanese par-
adigms. In the German-Japanese framework, the projects are basically of LT 
nature, similar to the labor and financial contracting. On the other hand, the 
US-UK paradigm basically shows that these relationships are made in a ST basis: 
projects, labor and financial contractS are based in a short-term approach. 
The second stylized fact, which is also connected with the first, refers to the im-
pact of the lender's type in the definition of the contract structure of the firmo We 
consider two types of fund providers: a bank and the financial markets. In the 
first type, characteristic of the German-J apanese paradigm, the credits are long-
term in nature and banks play an active role. In the second case, more common 
) 
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in the US-UK paradigm, the funds borrowed by the firms have to be returned 
following a short-term pattern. 
Regarding to the results we have obtained; we model the first stylized fact when 
we endogenize the bargaining lender-entrepreneur and entrepreneur-workers, and 
obtain the stated correlation that defines both paradigms. The German-Japanese 
approach, with LT projects f--t LT financial contracts f--t LT labor contracts; and 
the US-UK, with ST projects f--t ST financial contracts f--t ST labor contracts. 
With regard to the second stylized fact; we characterize the type of financing 
(bank-market) by proportion of rents the entrepreneur can keep in the second 
period, F, as a result to renegotiate a failed project 31i. Using this model we find 
that the length of the credits the entrepreneur obtains from a bank, is higher than 
the corresponding to the credits he can obtain through the market. This result is 
consistent with the previous description of economic paradigms. 
Making use of this results, it is possible to define a set of empirical tests that 
particularly fits the Spanish Economy. In particular: 
1/ To determine if the Spanish labor reforms in the 80's, have biased the ST 
labor contracting towards the ST-financed firms. In the same line, if the test has 
produced positive results, we can forecast the effects of the 1997 Spanish labor 
reform that try to give incentives to the firms to hire workers by means of LT 
contracts. Our model predicts (Proposition 1) that this measure will be most 
effective in firms with a LT financial structure. 
2/ It can also be interesting to implement a test by sectors, in order to check for 
a higher labor contract 's length in those mature industries (manufacture sector), 
where firm's financial structure is more LT. By contrast, in more young sectors 
(services), we should find a shorter labor contract's length. 
3/ A last test would be to analyze a possible change in the labor contracting 
policy followed by IPO's firms and by firms that have increased its market capi-
talization. Our model (Proposition 3) forecasts a rise in the proportion of workers 
hired through a ST contract. 
;le; "Te cOllsider that ballk's F is higher thall market's F. 
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5. FINAL REMARKS 
Our main objective of this paper has been to study the optimallength of the con-
tracts that define a firm (labor and financial). Moreover, we have approached this 
problem in an integrated way with other external features that strongly conditions 
firm's policy. In particular project's type, workers' skills and the characteristics 
of the financial institution which provides funds. 
We have followed the modern view of what is known as corporate governance 
of the firmo This idea applied to our framework leads to a unified treatment 
of the problem of determining the length of the labor and financial contracts. 
This method of analysis is radically different to the classical one, where both 
problems were dealt separately, and always considering the other type of contracts 
as exogenously given. Specifically, in the determination of the optimal length 
of the labor contracts, the financial structure of the firm has been traditionally 
ignored. Simply a balance was made between the commitment value of long-term 
contracts and the bigger fiexibility provided by the short-term ones. 
Apart from that, when financial contracts have been studied, the institution that 
provides the funds, designed the credit ignoring the effects of its decision on firms' 
labor contracting. In fact it balances the disciplinary effect of ST credits (due 
to the possibility of cutting the provision of funds in future periods) and the 
commitment effect of LT ones that leads to higher returns. 
In our work, we have found the mentioned trade-off in the labor contracting. 
Furthermore, we have shown the importance to introduce the length of the credits 
to properly analyze how the entrepreneur defines the length of the labor contracts. 
In this sense, the key factor in our study has been the ex-ante probability to 
renegotiate an initially unsuccessful project (= <p). Parameter directly linked to 
the average length of the financial contract (- 1 + <P ). We have proved that when 
the credit's length is higher (lower) than a given threshold level, 1 + <P*, then, all 
labor contracts signed initially are of LT (ST) type. 
Regarding the internal consequence of project's type, we have stated another 
resulto The lender supplies credits with a higher length when the financing is 
over a LT projects than over a ST project. This fact under the claim made in 
Proposition 1, determines a higher probability the entrepreneur will sign LT labor 
contracts when the firm undertakes a LT project instead of a ST project. If we 
put all together, we can state a positive correlation between ( projects's type -
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financial contract's type - labor contract's type ) in a direction that is consistent 
with the so called US-UK and German-Japanese paradigms. 
A second type of results, complementary to the aboye ones, is stated in Propo-
sition 3, where we find a relationship between "bank financing", "market financ-
ing" and contract's length. Banks favor LT and markets favor ST . 
Concerning possible limitations and shortcuts of the model; we can mention 
the rude characterization of the lender, with an exogenously given commitment 
parameter F, and with an extreme assumption over its bargaining power (zero-
market, one-bank). Another clear avenue of further research is the informational 
structure. The current symmetric nature is difficult to conciliate with the proper 
existence of financial intermediaries, that are not neutral funds provider but are 
involved in firms' decisions taking through monitoring and incentive activities. Fi-
nally we consider only two periods, and this does not allow us to study reputation 
problems that are so important in the analysis of contract's characterization. 
An extension ofthis model, proposed by Fama (1990), and partially made by 
J ohn, K. & J ohn, T. (1993) consists in the analysis of the interaction between 
both types of contracts (labor-financial), 1l0t under a temporal perspective, but 
considering the fix and variable nature they presento In this sense, financial con-
tracts "fixed - debt-type" ( "variable - equity-type " ) are correlated with labor 
contracts that are of fixed (variable 3ü) rewards. 
Further research should address all these questions in order to improve our 
knowledge of this important link between financial and labor issues. 
:JG Payment related performance 
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APPENDIX 
[] 
In the entrepreneur's maximization problem, the variables are nL , A,and nr . 
We first compute the derivative with respect to nf , that is: 
OaSEl{UEn} = pO El{U[3n} = ()pX(al - 2bX(1 + (J;)Nl ) - W = nI n l 
= -2b()pXí(1 + (J;)(Nl - Nn [N; = N; 2b9p~~~)+a~)] (A1.1) 
With regard to the A variable: 
l>. El {UEn } = l>. El {PeUfn} =:n wrnLp~[-()e + g~ (1 - ()A)] (A1.2) 
If we make use of expression (2) of first-period workers' effort e = ~(()rAWPe), 
(A1.2) assures that A = io . 
Finally, making use (A1.1) and the fact that in the optimal contract it is true 
that oa s El {U En} = O, we get in the following expression: 
n 2 
o~L El {UEn } = a~f El {UEn } - w(l- Pe) + p<I>wrc(1- ()A) as A = 210' we have: 
a~LEl{UEn} = ~El{UEn} +PeP<I>r¡ - w(l- Pe) [r¡ r~~2] (A1.3) 
Direct computations assures that BOC are also satisfied. 
W 
To get in the first result of Lemma 2, we have to prove that the threshold 
level for bank-financed firms, <PB, is lower than for market-financed firms, <P Af . 
To do so, we make use of the definition of <PB and cI>j,I' that is 6 B [cI>Bl = O and 
L::-,M[cI>j,fl = O, where 6[<pl is given by (7). As 6[cI>] is increasing in cI>, we onIy 
have to prove that 6 B [cI>AI] > O . 
From (7), 6 B [cI>j,f] = r¡pg[cI>AI]Pe[cI>Afl - w(l - Pe[cI>Af]) ::::} (by the definition of 
<P Af ) 6 B [<p Afl = r¡Pe[cI>AI]{pg[cI>AI] - p~f[cI>Af]} = r¡Pe{ cI>Af(l- ()p)(FB - FM )} >J¡; O 
The previous inequality assures that <PB ::; <P AI (A2.1) 
W 
To get in the required expression, which is only cI>-dependent, we have to use 
the constraints (13) and (14) to express Rl +()R2 in terms of cI>. We subtract (13) 
from ()p times (14), we find: 
()p(R1 + ()R2 ) - ()pJ2 - JI - 7r1 + [()p(l - F) - p<I>]ufn = ()pL (A3.1) 
'iVith (A3.1), lender's utility function transforms to: 
37 \Vhere we have used g~ = 9r~p," and the fact that El {nn > O ,that leads to ~ = O 
3b Remember that we have assumed that FB > FM 
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uFin = -11 + (}p(Rl +(}R2 - 12) + (1- (}p)L = 7rl + L + [P<I> - (}p(l- F))E2{Ufn} 
To arrange this, we make use of P<I> - (}p(l - F) = Fpe (A3.3) 
E2{U:fn} = E2{P2Q2} + 12 - (}R2 - n~w - nLw(l + )..(}re) (A3.4) 
By (14), we know that (}R2 - h = L - (1 - F)E2{Ufn}, then (A3.4) becomes: 
- - s L FE2{U:fn} = -L + E2{P2Q2} - n2w - 17, w(l + )..(}re) (A3.5) 
If we plug (A3.5) and (A3.3) in (A3.2), we obtain: 
uFin = 7rl + L + Pe(7r2 - L) which is the express ion (15). 
As a matter of completeness, we compute 7rl and 7r2 
7rl = El{PlQ¡} - (nr + nL)w = (}pN{Xl(a - b(l + fY;)N{) - N{w = 
= ((}p - ~)XlN{(a - w¡) (A3.6) 
Where we have used (5) to show nr + nL = N{. 
To compute 7r2 we have to distinguish two situations, depending if <I> ;: <I>*, which 
generates that n L = O or n L = N{ respectively. -
For <I> < <I>* 
7r2 =:i9 E2{P2Q2} - (n~)w = (}N;X2(a - b(l + fY;)N;) - N;w = 
= (() - ~)X2N;(a - W2) (A3.7) 
On the other hand, for <I> ~ <I>* 
7r2 = EdP2Qd - w(n~ + nL[l + )..(}reJ) = (}N;X2(a - b(l + fY;)N;)-
-N;w + wnLre = (() - k)X2N;(a - W2) + 2per¡N{ [r¡ _ r:~21 (A3.8) 
1I1arket Financing 
Let us now prove what Lemma 3 states, that is that the market-financing problem, 
also leads to expression (15). 
1I1ax{DFin} El{uEnt} - 11 +7rl-(}pRl +p<I>E2{U:fn} (12') 
S.t. - 11 + (}p(R l + (}R2 - 12) + (1 - (}p)L = O (13') 
S.t. (}R2 - h + (1 - F)E2{u:fn} = L (14) 
To arrange (12'), we make use of h - fJpR l from (13') and the definition of 
P<I> = (}p + (1 - (}p)<I>F : 
El {uEnt} = 7rl + (1 - (}p)L + (}p((}R2 - h + E2{U:fn}) + (1 - (}p)<I>F E2{U:fn} 
From (14) we make explicit F E2{U:fn}, to obtain: 
El {uEnt} = 7rl + Pe ((}R2 - h + E2{U:fn}) + (1 - Pe)L 
The definitions of E2{ufn} and 7r2 given in (A3.4) and (A3.7), leads to: 
El {uEnt} = 7rl + Pe7r2 + (1- Pe)L 
This is the same objective function of the bank-financing scenario, therefore we 
have completed the proof of Lemma 3 
3~ It is important to point out that to take expectations over period one is the same as to 
take expectations oyer period 2, due to our lID assumption over shocks. 
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W 
To prove Proposition 2, we make use of expressions (15) and (A3.8). 
UFin = 7r1 + Pe7r2 + (1 - Pe)L, where 7r1 and 7r2 are given by (A3.7) and (A3.8) 
respectively. We make the convention to note by L = (O - ~)X2N2(a - W2) and 
D = 2per¡N{ which is <I>-dependent through Pe' We also define D D[<I> = 1] 
and D = D[<I> = O]. The <I>-derivative with regard to UFin leads to: 
8 Fin { (1 - Op)[L - L] J f <I> < <I>* 
8ipU = (1-0p)[L+2D-L] Jf <I>2<I>* (A4.1) 
From (15) we show that for <I> = <I>* there is a shift in the lender utility function 
of an amount equal to Pe[<I>*]D[<I>*] > O. This fact will assure that for <I> = <I>* the 
lender considers optimal to increase <I> towards the LT- labor-contracting zone. 
\Ve now study (A4.1) for different L-values. 
1/ n'ivially, for L :S L , a~ U Fin > O for aH <I>, therefore it is optimal for the 
lender to sign an exclusive LT contract, that ís cj) = 1 
2/ For L < L < L+2D -ª-UFin > O for <I> < <I>* but -ª-UFin > O for <I> > <I>*. 
- - - -, a<I' 8ip-
Therefore to determine the optimallength, we have to compare the values of U Fin 
for <I> = O and <I> = 1. 
UFin[<I> = 1]- UFin[<I> = O] = D - (1- ep)(L - L) ~O if L;L + 1~P (A4.2) 
But for ep > ~ (which is assumed), it is true that 
L + 2D < L + l~P ~ cj) = 1 For L :S L + 2D 
3/ For L + 2D < L :S L + 2D 
In this situation, UFin is convex for <I> > <I>*, with the <I> that leads to a minimum 
in UFin being increasing in L, in such a way that for L = L + 2D the UFin is 
decreasing \i<I> 2 <I>* . Therefore, to determine the <I> optimal in this zone, we have 
to compare <I> = 1 with <I> = <I>~ 
UFin[<I> = l]-UFin [<I> = <I>~] =40 D+L(1-p~)-D(p~)2-(1-p~)(Lf) (A4.3) 
UFin[<I> = 1] - UFin[<I> = <I>~] ~O if L;L + D(l + p~) (A4.4) 
FinaHy, note that L + 2D <41 L + D(l + p~) < L + 2D < L + 1~P (A4.5) 
The last inequality, assures that cj) will always be higher than <I>* . 
Then, in the interval of liquidation considered, making use of (A4.5) and (A4.2), 
\ve can assure that: 
For L + 2D < L :S L + D(l + p~) ~ cj) = 1 (A4.6) 
And L + D(l + p~) < L :S L + 2D ~ cj) = <I>~ (A4.7) 
40 \Vhere we have used the convention p~ = Pc[<I>*] and the fact D[<I>*] = 2p~r¡Ni = p~D 
41 Simply by ()p > ~ 
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4/ L+2D:::; L 
In this zone, we know that U Fin is decreasing for all <I>. Therefore the optimal 
credit's length will be <i> = O or <i> = <I>¡. To choose the optimal value, we compute 
U Fin for both <I> values: 
uFin[<I>~] - UFin[O] = p~(L + p~D) - ()pL + (1 - p~)(Lf) - (1 - ()p)L (A4.8) 
(A48) assures that UFin[<I>*] - UFin[O] 2:0 if L5:. L + 75 (p~)2 (A49) 
. + < >- l-Op <p. • 
From (A4.9), we can assure that: 
For L+2D < L:::; L+ l~P(~? ~ ~ = <I>~ (A4.1O) 
And L + l~P (~t < L ~ <i> = O (A4.11) 
As a matter of completeness we put all together 42: 
For L :::; I L.F == L. + D(1 + p~) I ~ ~ = 1 (A4.12) 
If LF < L:::; LF == L. + &~ ~ <i> = <I>¡ (A4.13) 
For LF < L ~ ~ = O (A4.14) 
To finish the proof of Proposition 2, we have to show that LF = LF when r¡ ~ r¡*, 
which is the situation that leads to <I>* = O (pure LT labor contracting under 
both lender's type). To do so, we have to note that only threshold value LF is 
compatible with a situation where there is only LT labor contracts. 
But LF[<I>* = O] = L + D(1 + ()p) = LF[<I>* = O] = L 
[ID 
To prove first part of proposition 3, \Ve only have to show if LM :::; LB, and 
LB :::;LM : 
- (p. )2 - (p • . )2 
To prove L + ---.J;L ~ > 43 L + ~ ~ we only have to note: 
- 1-0p <P:B - - 1-0p <PAr ' 
a~. {(~t} = _(~)2 + (1 - ()p)2 < O for ()p ~ ~ (A5.1) 
B t b (A2 1) rF * < rF * tI e (p~ B)2 > (p~ Al )2 L < L u y . ~ B _ ~ A! ; ,lere10re _ --p--- ~ M _ B 
B M 
Finally, note that LB = L + D(1 + P~,B) < LM = L + D(1 + P~,M) by (<I>B :::; <I>j.I) 
"\Vith regard to the second part, if we see the graphic, we have to prove: 
If <I>E[LB - LB] - <I>j.I[LM - L M ] - [LA{ - LB] = O 
By (A4.12) and (A4.13), we can assure: 
<I>F[LF - LF] = 1~P[(p~,F)2 - (1 + p~,F)(1 - ()p)<I>pl = 
= 1~P[(P~,F)2 - (1 + P~,F)(P~,F - ()p)] = l~P[()P + (1 - ()P)(P~,F)] (A5.2) 
42 Note that the dependence with the type of financier, is made through the value of <P*, 
which is lower in the bank-financing's case than under the market-financing one (<PE < <PAf ). 
43 "\Vith P~,B == Pe [<pEJ and P~,M == Pe [<I>Af J 
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Therefore by (A5.2) and (A4.12), we obtain: 
If <PE [LB -LB] -<PM[LM-LMl - [LM-LBl = D[P~,M-P~,B - (p~,M-p~,B)l = O 
@] 
We have to prove that LF = L + l~P (~t , which is the threshold value that 
defines the switching from LT scenario to ST, is increasing in r¡. 
To prove 8;: > O, we have to note: 
1/ D = 2r¡N{ is positively correlated with r¡ 
8 (p~?} 2/ By (A5.1), 8cp' {cp. < O 
3/ By Lemma 2 8cp' < O :::} .!l. {(p~)2} > O (A6.1) 
, 8r¡ 8r¡ cp' 
[1J 
To prove Proposition 4, we have to check if 81;81 < O 
We first prove 8N¡ < O and aN2 > O 
as as 
aN¡ 8N¡ 1 8 {a-~¡} < O 'f ~ - w < a 44 
8S = 8X¡ = 2bOp(1+cr;) 8X¡ X¡ 1 Wl = OpX¡ "2 
S· '1 l· 8N2 - _8N2 - - 1 ~{a-~2} O'f ~ =....:Y!..... Q: ml1 ar y. 8S - 8X 2 - 2bO(1+crn 8X 2 X2 > 1 W2 - OX2 < 2 
At this stage, to prove 8J;f = 88S {L+ l~P (~?} < O, is rather straightforward: 
1/ 8:; = O, because ~[<pl is independent on S (see expression 7). 
2/ 8[5 < O by 8Nj < O 
8S as 
3/ ~~ = :s(8 - ~)X2N2(a - W2) = (8 - ~):s{X2N2(a - W2)} < O 
Similar argument, also assures ~~ < O 
44 See footnote 15 for this assumption, which is equivalent to consider that Xi is high enough. 
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